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Abstract of Paper
Nigeria's foreign exchange reserves plummeted to an all time loy,' in
1982. The trend since 1975 has by:~n progres$ivdy downwords and if kft
uncorrested would deplete the nations foreign exchange resources in no
distant future. It is argued in H1is paper that devalu2ition along with
other fiscal and monetary measures would serve to enhance the external
reserve position of the nation. The saiutory impact of the 1973 Nigo;:rian
devaluation can be repeated to correct the wor3cning trend in the nations
external asset position.
Some Economic Considerations for Nigerian Currency Devaluation
1. Introduction
Nigerian is basically a mono~product economy. Ninety percent of
her export is made up of oil and only about lO'Yv is made up of non oil
products. l The pursuit of independent exchange rate policy has not been
possible partly as a result since the economy depends excessively on inter·
national trade. (See table I for the composition of Nigeria's export trade)
Nigeria devalued her currency by 1l~·~ in 1973 for the first time
m response to U. S. devaluation the same year of the same amount.
Nigeria's foreign exchange reserves grew by 773.5 ::) ill 1974. Thus the
impact of the devaluatiou in the preceding year was salutory in enhancing
the foreigll exchange asset position of the Nation (Se¢ Table II On
Nigeria's foreign exchange). Many other factors contributed to the growth
of Nigeria's foreign exchange in 1974 amongst which is the increased
export of oil as a result of the 197.3 Arab-Israeli war and the increased oi./
price negotiated by OPEC of which Nigeria is a l1:1ember.
.. The :u\tj,or is Kcader ill Economics, Dcpartmcnt of FinaJ\cej Insural\cc, 1. l\.!. T.,
Euugu. Mailing addrees : P. o. nox 2234-, Er\llgu, Anarnbra State, Nigeria.
1 l·cdel'al Ttl'puhlic of Ni:::el'ia, Thirti XI/lianal Dr/lela/mlenl Pliln 1975·80.
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A CUr30ry look On Table r would shoN the progressive risc of the
oil sector in Nigeria's export trade. In 1966 it contributed 32.7 % of
Nigeria's export rMa~hing it:; highest level of 93.6 Iv in 1976. Prior to this
level, the non-oil sector, mainly agricultural ra.v m:lterDal~ dominated
Nigerias export sec~orK
Table 1
NIGEidA'S EXPORTS: THE OIL Al\D NON-SEcToRs 1966-1978
Year Oil Sector
(N- Million)
'Ii
, (1 Non-Oil
Seclor
(N ro.)
(1/
.v Total
(N m)
,,'/0
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
15\74
1975
1976
1977
1978
184.0
144.2
74.0
261.8
509.8
951.8
11762
1893.5
5365.7
4563.1
6321.6
7072.8
5401.6
32.7
29.8
17.5
41.2
57.6
73.4
82.1
83.1
92.6
92'6
93.6
92.7
89.1
378.2
339.4
348.2
374.0
375.6
345.6
258.0
384.9
429.1
362.4
429.4
557.9
662.8
67.3
70.2
82.5
58.8
42.4
26.6
17.9
16.9
7.4
7.4
6.4
7.3
10.9
562.2
483.6
422.2
635.8
885.4
1297.4
1432.2
2278.4
5794.8
4925.5
6751.1
7630.7
6064.4
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
SOflrees: Central Bank of Nigeria, Allllual Report< alld :}talell/ell/s "J ,ICCOlIl/ls and Le·
oIlOI/!ie 01/1/ Slatistieal Review (Central ]'!;1.'llli'lg Office, La30s).
Also as shown in Table If, Nigeria's external reserVes have had a
checkered history. What we have is instability and fluctuations until 1974.
Since then. there is a marked definite and progressive drop. If trend
continues, our reserves would deplete in no distant future. The 1982 oi
glut and the dimunition in our reserves is a valid case in point.
This has kd to the current debates on the efiectiveness of devaluation
vis-a-vis import restriction measures in shoring up Nigeria's fordgn ex·
change reserves. In April 1982, the Federal Government of Alhaji
IKE: ~fdbofAk Cr~obkCv DEVALUATION
Table II
NIGERIA'S EXTERNAL RESERVES 19TM~1978
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Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
Amount
(}:q million)
160
284
284
389
3,398
3,315
2,991
2,439
1,161
Annual Rate
of change
66.7
77.5
10.6
53.1
773.5
-2.5
-9.8
-18.5
-52.3
s.urce: C. N. fson~I "Nigeria's E»;ternal Finance", .."Iigerian Journal (if International
Affairs, Vol. I, p. 51.
Shehu Shagari passed an Economic Stabilization Act through the parlia~
ment, this was a draconian measurl:l intended to reduce substantially
Nigeria's import of goods and services. Such measures although prohibi·
ted by the Articles of Association of the 1. M. F. have been in vogue in
d¢veloping countries as modes of accommodation to shortfalb in foreign
exchange reserves. Apologists of such measures are ,fraid of stated
consequences of devaluation. According to them, devaluation signifies a
disaster, an admission that traditional meanS of accommodation have been
exhausted.
This is not right. Niger,ia devalued in 1973 without any attempts
to explore and exhaust other options of accommodation op~n to her.
Great Britain devalued in 1967. The U. S. has devalued in 1973 and
France did same in 1969 followed by her 14 Francophone African
countries. Cevaluation thus should not be seen as an outland ish and
terrible act, it is a permissible method of repegging the exchange value of
a currency in the light of new supply demand reality. The International
Monetary Fund (I. M. F.) allows countries to devalue in order to correct
"fundamental disequilibrium" in their balance of. payments.
Pros and Cons of Devaluation
It is argued that our trade position may not be improved. The
effeet of depreciation would be to '" orsen the terms of trade and that
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adjustments to the altered international trade price" take time to materia-
lise. Although changes in the terms of trade would appear adverse this
is to lead towards enhancement of our exporls and the reduction of
imports in response to the relative price changes. According to AlfmLi
Marshall and Abba Lerner (Marshall Lerner COlldition),2 devaluation
would improve trade balance if the sum of price elasticities of demand of
a country's imports and exports exceeds unity.
Sub3equently the meaStlremcnts of the~ ela"ticiti.::s give rise to an
"elasticities pessimism" which pointed to tl1e practical difficulties of attain-
ing the requisite magnitude of elasticity that NQuid make devaluation
yield the required result. This pessimism is eVen more pertinent with
developing countries with traditionally low demand elasticities for imports
and weak supply response. This is not so for Nigeria where the demand
elasticities for imports are high and the supply response is strong.
In the 3hort run, it is further argu~dK pril~es of our primary export
commoditie3 including petroleum might have been predt:termined in the
world markets, so that exchange depreciation is unlikely to confer any
more benefits in terms of increased receipts.
Even where prices are preC:et.:rmined, the lower the prices in terms
of currencies of importing countries, the more that is going to be expor-
ted by Nigeria. Unless the supply is fixed, which is not so. And given
a high demand elasticity, the greater the demand, the greater the total
revenue. So the nation's total receipts cannot be static unless demand
elasticities are low.
It is also .argued that owing to our growing need for imports, dev-
aluation would have enta,iled higher import prices. Further that dev-
aluation would add to domestiu inflation. The high import prices would
reduce demand for foreign goods and curtail our expenditure of foreign
exchange to service a high import bill. Inflationary (,'Onsequences of
devaluation can be mitigated by the use of additional fiscal and mone-
tary controls to mop up domestic liquidity.
(2) Recommendations and Conclusion
A recent study by Nigeria's Central Bank3 shows that devalua-
tion would enhance Nigerias balance of payments position if this is not
2 C.C. Qzumba "Devaluation and Balance of payments in E COW A S countries:
A study ofl'\igria', Exchange Rate pOlicy" Central Bank of Nigeria, ECO'IOmic and FinaMial
RevilwVol16,No.l,1978.
a .Ihid.
IK<;: NIGERIAN CUI{RENCY DEVAU.'.\'IION 73
done in isolation. Thus in combination with stringent monetary controls
aimed at restricting the growth of domestic credit, devaluation \\ ill
improve the balance of payments picture comiderably.
Since interest rates in Nigeria are generally low everaging about
12%, which is below the average rate of inflation and as such real rates
of interest are indeed negative, a step in the right direction should come
from raising the interest rate~ to encourage savings. Further, the direc-
tion of trade should b~ changed away from mainly metropolitan coun-
tries i.e. Britain, France, U. S. to other countries of Europe and Asia
where kig~ria can in pure barter terms exchange her oil for capital and
technology, This mayor may not n<:ed any foreign exchange to consum-
ate. The composition of Nigeria's export trade should also be changed.
A shift from a mono-product economy to a more diversified economy is
suggested so that fluctuations in export earnings from one source can
be mitigated by stability in othen. The nation would thus benefit from
the statistical law of large numbers by diversification. Taking a dyna-
mic view of the economy agricultural products and manufactured goods
would attain international price competitivene33 with devaluation and
the present composition of exports would change for the better. In con-
clusion, Nigeria should devalue the Naira currency by about 10% or
more.4.
4. ~ 1=1 .I,} gramme, of gold
$ 1=0.63 grammes of gold
Therefore N > $ hy $!. 12-0. 63=0.43 UJ\iu
Therefore % aDprcciatiol\=37%. But maximum allowable rale of devaluation
without conmltaliof\.' with r. IV£' F.=IO%
10
